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The Chinese Economy: Emergence and
Evolution
by Ro ´na ´n Hickey and Jenny Osborne*
1. Introduction
Since 1978 China has undertaken a series of economic reforms
that have transformed the domestic economy, progressively
opening it up to international trade and investment. As a result,
China has grown rapidly to become the sixth largest global
economy
1. The long-term average rate of growth has been about
9 per cent, the fastest of any country on the globe during the
two-decade-plus period, while per capita GDP has risen from
about $300 in 1980 to $1000 in 2002. Moreover, China’s GDP
per capita is still only a fraction of levels in Japan, the NIE’s, and
most of ASEAN-4
2, suggesting that there is much more growth to
come.
In many ways, China’s importance is already apparent. China has
been a leading engine of the world economy, accounting for a
significant proportion of global growth since the mid-1990s. High
and sustained economic growth is not only well above the
regional average, it has been combined, until recently, with low
inflation, and even deflation, and a strong external position.
China has become the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct
investment and, reflecting its favourable external position, and
its pegged exchange rate vis-a `-vis the US dollar, China’s foreign
exchange reserves have reached record levels. However, some
indicators signal problems. There are growing concerns that the
Chinese economy may be overheating. High and rising
economic growth is now being accompanied by a pick-up in
inflation and there is also evidence of a credit and investment
boom, which, in turn, is having some impact on the property
market.
Against this background, this paper reviews China’s economic
performance, and examines from, both a domestic and global
perspective, some of the issues that its rapid economic rise has
brought to the fore. Section 2 takes a look at longer-term
developments, while section 3 focuses on the more immediate
past. The remainder of the paper then turns its attention to short
*The authors are economists in the European Monetary Affairs and International Relations
Department. The views expressed in this paper are the personal responsibility of the authors
and are not necessarily held by the CBFSAI or by the ESCB. The authors would like to thank
John Flynn for his comments and invaluable assistance in completing this paper.
1 Using market exchange rates (Spatafora, 2004). China is the second largest economy
measured at purchasing power parity, according to the Economist.
2 The ASEAN-4 comprise of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The NIE’s comprise
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and medium-to-long term issues that have come about as a result
of China’s emergence, and outlines reforms that will be
necessary to ensure the benefits of China’s integration are
maximised. Before beginning it is important to emphasise that
any evaluation of the Chinese economy is based on data, the
quality of which is regarded by many as indicative.
2. China’s long-run economic and exchange rate
performance
2.1 China’s long-run economic performance
China has followed an ‘export-led growth strategy’, with external
trade expanding at a more rapid pace than the economy,
reflecting the substantial increase in openness in the last twenty
years. Trade reforms and, over the past decade, commitments
made as part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession
process have been crucial in increasing China’s integration into
the world economy
3 (chart one shows the evolution of Chinese
exports and imports).
Table 1: China: Market share in major export markets
(Imports from China divided by total imports)
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
Japan 0.5 1.4 3.1 5.1 10.7 14.5 16.6 18.3
United States — — 0.5 3.2 6.3 8.6 9.3 11.1
European Union 0.8 0.6 0.7 2.0 3.7 6.2 6.7 7.5
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
In 1977, China accounted for only 0.6 per cent of world trade
and was ranked thirteenth in the world, but by 2000 these figures
had increased to 3.7 per cent and seventh in the world
respectively. Since then it has continued to expand, surpassing
Canada, the UK and France to become the fourth largest
economy trading, and account for 25 per cent of the expansion
in world trade in 2002.
4 Exports have been the main driver of
growth, as well as the catalyst for economic developments,
growing about 15.5 per cent a year between 1980 and 2002.
5
In 2002, both exports and imports increased about 21 per cent,
faster than any other major economy, while global trade was
evidently flat. More recently, China surpassed Japan to become
the world’s third biggest trading nation, behind only Germany
and America. China is now a preferred destination for the
relocation of global manufacturing facilities, and its strength as
3 China has been a member of the WTO since December 2001, but the impact of its
membership has had an important influence on Chinese trade policies since the early
1990’s. The accession process resulted in key reforms taking place — most notably the
reduction of tariff barriers — and membership is expected to continue to facilitate China’s
global integration in the coming years, increasing access to foreign markets and opening
up the domestic services sector to international trade.
4 Lardy (2003,3).
5 Trade as a share of GDP rose from 13% in 1980 to 50% in 2002.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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an export platform has contributed to incomes and jobs. At the
same time, imports have risen 40 per cent, making it a
locomotive for growth in the Asian region.
As history has shown, China’s business cycle appears to behave
differently to many G-7 countries. Its rising share in world output
and low correlation with G7 output growth, means that it has a
growing influence in the global business cycle. Both during the
Asian crisis and the recent global slowdown China behaved
counter-cyclically
6. A question remains as to whether it will
continue to have a role in dampening cyclical swings, both in the
region and globally.
2.1.1 Sources of growth
While external trade and FDI flows have been the main drivers
of growth, from a growth accounting perspective, capital
accumulation has accounted for the bulk of the GDP expansion
since 1978, contributing around 4-6 percentage points.
Reflecting this, the investment ratio has been very high, around
40 per cent as a share of GDP. FDI flows have played a
significant role in facilitating capital accumulation and
subsequently growth in this period. By 2002 FDI flows were
more than $50bn or 4 per cent of GDP. The other main engine
of growth has been strong total factor productivity growth (TFP),
rising from zero to close to three percent, with structural reforms
having a significant impact. The liberalisation of the agricultural
sector in the early 1980’s and the acceleration of market-oriented
reforms in the early 1990’s led to strong growth in industrial
enterprises and agriculture (Heytens and Zebregs, 2003).
Moreover, a more efficient allocation of labour, stemming from
labour migration, has been a key contributor to output growth.
Growth since the late 1970’s reflects in large part the expansion
of labour-intensive industries. As reforms took hold, export
growth became increasingly concentrated in labour intensive
products, in which China has a relatively strong comparative
advantage — these products included textiles, apparel, footwear
and toys. For each of these products China captured a rapidly
rising share of total world exports (see table 2 below), and
between 1980 and 1998 exports of these items increased more
than ten fold, increasing from roughly $4.3bn to $53.5bn. Today
China is among the top five traders in several goods categories.
More recently, China has been an important reprocessing centre
and manufacturing hub of consumer electronics, computers and
other IT products — the growing importance of which is reflected
in the US market. In addition, while China is being used as a
manufacturing platform for sales to the global market, foreign
6 China maintained its growth even in the face of a global growth recession in 2001 and an
anaemic recovery in 2002. During 1997-2003 China’s business cycle has displayed a
correlation of only 0.0 and 0.2 with the business cycles of the world and the US respectively.
(IMF World Economic Outlook, 2004)Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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firms are increasingly selling to the domestic sector — increasing
competitiveness.
7







Source: N. Lardy, ‘‘Trade Liberalization and its Role in Chinese Economic Growth’’, IIE, November
2003.
*Share of China’s total exports accounted for by these four product categories.
Reflecting developments in the economy, the private sector now
accounts for more than 60 per cent of China’s GDP, and
reflecting the scale of FDI flows, foreign funded enterprises now
account for half of China’s exports. This brings into focus, the
extent to which FDI flows, facilitated by trade reforms and the
general opening of the economy, have played a significant role in
the export-led growth strategy. A significant proportion of these
inflows have come from Asia itself, as countries outsource to
China for the assembly of labour intensive goods (see
table 3). While this relocation through FDI inflows was somewhat
dampened by SARS in the first half of 2003, it has rebounded
subsequently.
8 Albeit the bulk of FDI flows have been to the
manufacturing sector, foreign investment in finance, insurance,
education, and culture and media has also risen by a significant
amount.
Table 3: China, FDI Flows, USD Billions (actually utilised,
cumulative)
FDI flows 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Japan 2.97 2.92 4.35 4.19 5.05
Korea 1.28 1.49 2.15 2.72 4.49
US 2.03 2.61 2.61 3.36 4.06
Taiwan 2.60 2.30 2.98 3.97 3.38
Singapore 2.64 2.17 2.14 2.34 2.06
Germany 1.37 1.04 1.21 0.93 0.86
UK 1.05 1.17 1.05 0.89 0.75
Thailand 1.48 2.04 1.94 1.88 1.74
Total 40.40 40.77 46.85 52.74 53.51
Source: Ecowin
According to the United Nations (2004), China’s global ranking
for FDI flows in the next two years appears very favourable.
China and India are expected to lead, followed by the US, as the
7 Increased competition is having a transforming influence on China’s domestic economy.
The three areas most affected are; the decline in employment in the state sector, the
shrinkage in the rate of inventory accumulation, and the upturn in profitability of China’s
state-owned manufacturing firms.
8 Despite FDI slowing down from the big increase in 2001 and 2002, there has only been a























countries for which FDI prospects are the greatest. For many
developed countries, especially in Europe, which have
traditionally been among the largest FDI recipients, prospects
appear less bright than for certain developing countries such as
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Republic of Korea.
2.2 China’s long-run exchange rate performance
China’s decision to follow an export-led growth strategy has also
been supported by its exchange rate policies. Its current foreign
exchange system is made up of two components — a managed
floating exchange rate pegged to the US dollar, and wide-ranging
capital account controls that limit cross-border capital
transactions (see Box 1). Chart two outlines the recent evolution
of the renminbi (RMB), the official currency of the People’s
Republic of China
9, in nominal terms against the US dollar. Its
development over this period can be divided into three broad
phases: (1) a fixed exchange rate system during much of the
1980’s; (2) the dual exchange rate regime that operated between
1988 and 1993; and (3) the managed floating system that
replaced the dual system in 1994 and continues to operate
today.
For much of the 1980’s the Chinese authorities operated a fixed
exchange rate regime. As chart two shows, however, the RMB
was devalued several times over this period, reflecting both
economic developments and the adoption of the Asian-model of
export-led growth, supported by a competitively valued
exchange rate. In 1988, this system was changed to a complex
dual exchange rate and currency regime. Foreigners wishing to
obtain Chinese currency could still do so at a relatively
unfavourable official fixed rate, but in China a market-determined
exchange rate was used for trade-related transactions. Foreigners
were forced to use foreign exchange certificates as a proxy for
the currency, while use of the RMB was limited to domestic
trades only. However with the domestic ‘swap rate’ lower than
the ‘official’ international rate, a thriving black market in currency
transactions emerged. To counter this, the official exchange rate
was brought to more realistic levels over the course of the next
five years, represented on chart two by the gradual devaluation
over this time.
The dual system lasted until 1994 when it was replaced by a
single currency and exchange rate. At the time the official and
market swap rates stood at 5.8 and 8.7 against the US dollar
respectively. The reform applied the market swap rate as the
base rate, which, on paper, represented a sharp devaluation
(explaining the sharp fall in the value of the RMB in the chart at
the start of 1994) of the Chinese currency. In reality, however,
given the proliferation of the black market, the actual devaluation
was far less substantial. While officially described as a controlled




























float, since mid-1995 the Chinese currency has been pegged
against the US dollar within a very narrow range of plus or minus
0.3 percentage points from the central rate. In practice, the
People’s Bank of China (PBC) has intervened to limit actual
fluctuations to just plus or minus 0.1 percentage points in recent
years.
Box 1 — Capital controls in China
10
For a currency to achieve full convertibility it must be easily convertible for
both current and capital account transactions. Since 1996 the RMB has
been fully convertible for the former of these — such as trade in goods and
services — but significant restrictions on cross-border capital flows mean it
remains, for the most part, unconvertible for capital account dealings. Full
convertibility was a policy objective of the Chinese authorities as recently
as late 1997 (when the aim was full convertibility by 2000), but following
the Asian crisis, currency stability became the primary concern of exchange
rate policy. In general, the severest controls are placed on riskier short-term
items such as portfolio flows and foreign debt. Capital controls that are
currently in place include restrictions on access to financial markets (both
restrictions on access by foreign investors to Chinese markets and Chinese
investors to foreign markets), restrictions on borrowing from overseas
markets, and restrictions on outward direct investment by domestic
enterprises. Inward direct investment, on the other hand, is strongly
encouraged. Of the capital markets that have been partly opened to foreign
investors, some segregation exists between residents and non-resident
investors (for example separate equity and bond markets exist for non-
residents and domestic investors), and between domestically funded and
foreign funded enterprises (the latter can borrow overseas without
approval). Whereas the Chinese authorities have come under increasing
pressure to alter their current exchange rate policy, there have been fewer
calls for them to liberalise capital controls in the short-run. China has made
no commitment in the WTO negotiations to fully liberalise the capital
account, though individual measures appear to be envisaged. This gradual
approach reflects a concern that, given the combination of a high domestic
savings ratio and domestic banking sector fragility, moving too quickly
could trigger sizeable capital outflows.
2.2.1 Real effective exchange rate developments
Adopting a peg does not automatically guarantee an
improvement in an economy’s competitiveness levels. How
competitive an economy is depends as much on relative price
levels as it does on its nominal exchange rate, and accordingly,
to see how China’s international competitiveness evolved over
this period we need to observe how its real effective exchange
rate
11 (REER) changed. Chart three outlines China’s REER from
the start of the 1990’s
12. Following the broad trend set in the
previous decade, China’s REER declined by almost a third
between 1990 and 1993 (implying an improvement in
competitiveness), as exchange rate devaluations compensated
for an increase in the domestic inflation rate. This trend reversed
10 For a more detailed look at capital controls see Neely (1999).
11 A real exchange rate is a nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative prices. An effective
exchange rate is a composite index of the value of the domestic currency, or to be more
specific is the exchange rate of the domestic currency vis-a `-vis other currencies weighted
by their share in either the country’s international trade or payments (OECD definition).











Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1
"04
Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1
'02
Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1
'01














in 1994, and apart from a brief period in 1998 — when other
Asian currencies rebounded from their Asian crisis lows — the
Chinese REER continued to appreciate until the end of 2001
(increasing by 50 per cent over this period as a whole). This
appreciation initially reflected a stronger inflation rate in China
than in its main trading partners, but following the introduction
of the peg in mid-1995 was primarily driven by a broad based
appreciation of the US dollar. Movements in the US currency
have also been the catalyst behind the REER’s depreciation since
early 2002, particularly last year when Chinese inflation picked-
up once again.
3. Economic developments over the past decade
This long-term trend of rapid integration and strong economic
growth has been sustained in recent years. However, these
developments have not been altogether positive, as more
recently, the strength of economic expansion has been coupled
with growing concerns that the domestic economy may be
overheating.
3.1 China and the Asian Crisis
Despite domestic uncertainties and the difficult world economic
environment, China’s GDP growth has remained resilient in
recent years. Its external position has strengthened considerably,
and given its increasing integration into the global economy, it
has provided a significant impetus to world demand.
13 During
the Asian crisis (1997-1998), China maintained relatively strong
growth, while holding its peg between the RMB and the US
dollar intact, despite a weak financial sector, sizeable currency
devaluations in the rest of non-Japan Asia, and a rise in export
competition from these countries. China was unmoved by the
crisis for a number of reasons, highlighted by Aherne, Fernald
and Loungani, 2001. Despite the large banking system and
prevalence of bad loans and other institutional weaknesses,
China did not experience the credit boom and bust that was
common in many other East Asian countries, helped in part, by
the fact that capital controls prevented Chinese financial
institutions from borrowing excessively abroad. China was also
less affected by relative price effects from depreciation in other
countries, despite the increased export competition and the
reduced incomes of Asian economies. As a consequence,
China’s external position remained relatively favourable
compared to the rest of Asia. During this period, Chinese exports
were supported by the strength of the US and European
economies, which offset the impact of exchange rate
depreciation and economic weakness elsewhere in Asia. This
reflects a more general trend, whereby the state of demand in
trading partner countries is a key determinant of demand for
Chinese exports.
13 Since the country joined the WTO in December 2001, the economy’s links to the outside
world have accelerated.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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3.2 More recent developments
In recent years, the Chinese economy expanded as a result of
acceleration in fixed asset investment, a steady increase in
consumption and strong export growth, all of which encouraged
a sharp rise in production. China grew by 9.1 per cent in 2003
— the highest rate since 1997, driven by domestic demand and,
in particular, private consumption and fixed investment. Industrial
sector growth in 2003 was 12.5 per cent, while the services
sector grew by 6.7 per cent. So far in 2004, the Chinese
economy has continued to grow at a rapid rate — first quarter
growth is estimated at 9.8 per cent, with investment,
consumption and exports continuing to show solid growth.
Table 4: Real GDP growth 2003
% Structure of GDP, 2003 % of GDP Growth
GDP 9.1 Agriculture 14.8 2.5
Investment 26.7 Industry 52.9 12.5
Retail Sales 9.1 Services 32.3 6.7
Exports 34.6
Imports 39.9
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China
While robust growth has been accompanied by a strong increase
in manufacturing and services employment, the rate of job
creation is a key issue for the Chinese economy. Unemployment
continues to be underpinned by structural job losses in rural
areas and layoffs from state owned non-financial enterprises
(SOE’s), and a sizeable surplus of labour still exists in the rural
sector (about 150m) and the SOE’s (about 10-11m)
14. One of the
main challenges that remains is to absorb this surplus labour into
sustainable employment. Nevertheless, robust growth made
substantial contributions to reducing poverty last year, when the
number of poor was estimated to be slightly over 150 million,
compared to 360 million in 1990 (according to the World
Bank
15).
External demand, which has provided a significant impetus to
Chinese growth, continued to expand strongly in 2003, with
exports rising 34.6 per cent. Nevertheless, the trade balance
shrank to US$25.4 billion in 2003, from US$30.4 billion in 2002,
as a result of imports rising sharply (see table 5)
16. This trend
continued into 2004, with the trade balance for the first quarter
negative, reflecting a 42 per cent (year-on-year) increase in
imports.
14 Brooks (2004).
15 According to the World Bank, much of the global poverty reduction during the last two
decades was accounted for by China.
16 Merchandise exports accounted for 5.9 per cent of world trade, while services exports
accounted for 2.5 per cent. In relation to imports, merchandise imports accounted for 5.3
per cent of world trade, while services imports accounted for 3.1 per cent (Source: WTO).Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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Table 5: Trade (2003 and Q1 2004)
2003 Estimates for 2004 Q1
US $bn % Change US $bn % Change (y-y)
Exports 438.5 34.6 115.7 34.1
Imports 412.8 39.9 124.1 42.3
Source: Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China
As regards price developments, since deflation bottomed out in
mid-2002 (prices declining 0.8 per cent in 2002, the result of
strong productivity growth), there has been a continuous and
accelerating pattern of price rises against a background of strong
growth. While the official CPI inflation rate for 2003 as a whole
was 1.2 per cent, more recently the year-on-year rate has
accelerated above 4 per cent for the first time since 1997. The
pick-up in inflation is the result of growing domestic demand, the
expansion of the money supply and an increase in commodity
prices.
3.3 Recent exchange rate developments
Following its introduction in 1995, the Chinese authorities’
decision to operate a currency peg has played an important role
in supporting the pick-up in domestic macroeconomic conditions
(rapid economic growth, weaker inflationary pressures and
stronger FDI inflows). More recently, however, there is growing
evidence that the peg to the dollar may be having a detrimental
effect on the domestic economy. The greatest concern surrounds
the extent to which the current level of the exchange rate is
encouraging an unsustainable rate of economic growth, not only
by making Chinese exports relatively cheaper, but also through
its impact on the domestic money supply. The exchange rate
regime has primarily impacted on the money supply through
foreign exchange market intervention to keep the peg intact. The
combination of strong export driven Chinese economic growth
and a depreciating US dollar has put upward pressure on the
RMB in recent years, and forced the Chinese authorities to
undertake substantial foreign exchange market intervention. This
process of selling RMB and buying US dollars to maintain the
peg has fuelled strong growth in liquidity, and attempts by the
PBC at sterilisation have been only partly successful. As a result,
the money supply has increased sharply, fuelling a credit boom.
Against this background, as already noted, inflation has started
to rise rapidly. In effect, by pegging to the dollar, the Chinese
authorities have given up their autonomy over domestic
monetary policy, and consequently, many consider that domestic
monetary conditions have become inappropriately loose. Given
the stage of the business cycle that China finds itself at, this has
encouraged over-investment and a worsening of the already
sizeable NPL problem of Chinese banks. In a recent attempt to
reduce credit growth, the government has favoured aQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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combination of increasing reserve requirements (a policy that has
been significantly undermined by the impact of the increased
money supply on banks reserves) and introducing measures to
limit investment expenditure
17. The latter include the
consolidation of central government spending, a temporary
lending moratorium on certain industries and increased equity
requirements for shareholders in investment projects in four
sectors identified as overheating (steel, cement, aluminium and
real estate). The pattern that has developed of investment fuelled
by bank lending, and visible and incipient price pressures, has
led many to question the appropriateness of the present
exchange rate regime and its reform. This is discussed in more
detail in section six.
4. Short and long-term issues going forward
The emergence of China has brought to the fore a number of
short and medium-to-long term issues for both the Asia region
and the global economy as a whole. This section begins by
examining the implications of China’s expansion for its
neighbouring economies, before focusing on global issues, both
in the short and longer term.
4.1 China in the region
What have been the implications of China’s economic growth
for its neighbouring economies? There are two opposing views
on the nature of the trade links between China and emerging
Asia (Aherne, Fernald, Loungani, Schindler, 2003). Firstly, that the
economies are comrades, benefiting from expanding intra-
regional trade in Asia. The second view is that they are
competitors for market share in major export markets such as the
US, since they produce goods that are relatively close substitutes.
The growing degree of interdependence is evidenced by the fact
that intra-regional trade has accelerated in recent years, and
China’s role as a processing hub for exports from the region has
increased significantly. The trade liberalisation triggered by
China’s accession to the WTO has had a considerable impact.
The economic performance in China now has significant positive
‘spillover effects’ on the rest of the region, and China’s fast
growth has supported the recent recoveries in neighbouring
countries, as imports have surged from the rest of Asia. In 2003,
intra-regional trade accounted for almost half of the region’s total
trade, and was one of the main sources of export growth. Two-
thirds of Chinese imports came from Asia (with just 17 and 8 per
cent coming from Europe and the US respectively) while demand
from China accounted for approximately 90 per cent of Taiwan’s
17 There is some evidence to suggest that China’s tightening measures are having some effect.
Growth in fixed-asset investment slowed in May to 18.3% year-on-year, down from 47.8%
in quarter one. Also, annual growth in industrial production, imports, money supply and
bank lending slowed. However, retail sales continued to accelerate.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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export growth, 70 per cent of Japan’s export growth and 40 per
cent of Korea’s export growth (see table 6 for further
information). The most noteworthy change in recent years is that
industrialised countries in the region are increasingly shifting
early and labour intensive stages of their production processes
to China, while concentrating their own output on the more
skilled and capital-intensive parts. As a result, China is running
growing trade deficits with these countries while it is expanding
its trade surplus with the US.
18 While these economies continue
to be vulnerable to downturns in developed country markets,
their increased dependence on the Chinese market puts the
spotlight on the management of domestic demand in China.
Table 6: Share of national exports going to China (in per cent)
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
Japan 2.1 5.0 6.5 7.7 9.6
Malaysia 2.1 2.7 3.1 4.3 5.6
Thailand 1.2 2.9 4.1 4.4 5.2
Korea 0.9 7.3 10.7 12.1 14.6
Taiwan 0.0 0.3 2.8 3.9 7.6
Source: CEIC
On the other hand, some indication of the degree of export
competition within the region can be had by looking at the
pattern of exports to the US. In the period 1989-2002, national
shares of exports to the US from the region have changed
dramatically. China and Hong Kong have doubled their share of
exports, Asian NIE’s have halved their share, while the ASEAN-4
have held their own. As a result, China’s gains in market share
have not displaced ASEAN-4 labour intensive economies, but
they have had a negative effect on exports from the NIE’s in
industries such as apparel, footwear and household products.
Nevertheless, exports from China and other Asian economies to
the US tend to move together, suggesting that demand from
developed economies is a more important determinant of Asian
exports than competition with China. Additionally, the increasing
vertical integration of product markets in several economies in
the region, has helped provide value added to a single device —
i.e. DVD.
While, on the one hand, evidence suggests that China and other
Asian economies are competitors — since China is displacing
other countries of emerging Asia in major export markets such
as the US — on the other hand, there are two fundamental
reasons which suggest they are also comrades. Firstly, China itself
has emerged as a major importer of goods from countries of
emerging Asia, and secondly, the ongoing specialisation which
18 Industrialised countries have shifted focus from labour-intensive manufacturing to high-value
added manufacturing, services, logistics and research and development — i.e. Singapore
has shifted from electronic production to pharmaceuticals industry, while Taiwan has shifted
from manufacturing to research and development.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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seems to be occurring suggests that Asian countries are, in effect,
organising production of goods in a way that increases the
efficiency with which they can export.
4.2 China and the global economy
4.2.1 Current issues
(1) Is China supporting global growth?
The rapid development of the Chinese economy over the last
twenty years has injected vitality into the global economy and
created the necessary conditions for economic growth in some
countries. China’s economy has become so large that it is
beginning to serve as an engine of growth not only in Asia, but
even globally (China accounted for one-quarter of global growth
in the period 1995-2002). The long-term rate of growth has been
about nine per cent, the fastest of any country on the globe
during the two-decade plus period. Trade integration with the
world economy has proceeded at a rapid pace, a trend that
seems set to continue. Consequently, if China experiences
significant economic problems in the future, this is likely to have
a far greater impact on the global economy than it had in the
past, for example, ten years ago, when China had its last
overheating experience. The increased supply of low cost goods
and services from China has significantly changed global trade
patterns and relative prices. In addition, China has emerged as
an important source of global demand, particularly for
commodities and intermediate products, having become the
world’s second largest consumer of oil and fourth largest
importer of steel.
Table 7: Real GDP (annual percentage change)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
f 2005
f
World 4.2 2.8 3.7 4.7 2.4 3.0 3.9 4.6 4.4
US 4.5 4.2 4.4 3.7 0.5 2.2 3.1 4.6 3.9
Euro Area 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 0.4 1.7 2.3
Japan 1.8 −1.2 0.2 2.8 0.4 −0.3 2.7 3.4 1.9
China 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.5 8.0 9.1 8.5 8.0
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2004
(2) Deflation/inflation — is China a source of price volatility for
the global economy?
The past eighteen months has witnessed a considerable
turnaround in the assessment of global price prospects, with the
focus shifting from concern about the emergence of a global
deflation risk in Spring 2003 to worries about the return of
inflation more recently. While China is not seen as being central
to these developments, it is seen by some as playing a
contributory role in both cases. While deflation concerns in 2003
were largely related to the conjunction of low global inflation
with ample spare capacity and the prospect of below potentialQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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growth in the major economies, other factors were also
highlighted as adding to the risks. Among other things, these
included the potential for falls in the prices of traded goods to
be a source of global deflation. This was seen as arising in a
situation where emerging market countries with falling unit
labour costs would be able to lower prices and, potentially,
export deflation. With prices for manufactured goods in
international markets having fallen significantly since the mid-
1990s, and China rapidly increasing its share of global trade over
the same period, attention came to focus on the extent to which
China was contributing to global deflation risks. Studies suggest
that the impact of Chinese exports on global prices, while non-
negligible, has actually been fairly modest
19. While there have
been some effect of US imports from China on US import prices,
the small size of this effect and the relatively low share of imports
in US GDP has meant that, ultimately, the impact on US
consumer prices has been modest. Moreover, imports from
China have little apparent effect on US producer prices. In
addition, China’s record of very high export growth is by no
means exceptional. East Asia, Hong Kong and Korea also posted
very high export growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and there is no
evidence that they contributed to global deflation. In general, it
would appear that the main source of global deflationary
concerns stemmed from developments in the major economies.
More recently, however, the focus switched from concerns
about the risk of possible deflation to the potential return of
inflation. While other factors, such as oil price developments and
the sharp pick-up in global growth are seen as the main drivers
of this change, once again, there has been a focus on the extent
to which developments in China have played some role. In this
instance, given that rising oil and commodity prices are seen as
the main threat, the question has been asked to the extent to
which a rapidly growing economy, which has experienced very
strong growth in commodity-intensive industries, is adding to
global price pressures. Once again, the prevailing answer would
seem to be that it is having a moderate impact, but there are
also many other factors at work in the major economies.
(3) China and industrialised country jobs?
A view taken by some is that the large loss in US manufacturing
jobs between 2001 and 2003 was the result of the bilateral trade
deficit that the United States has with China. On the whole, this
is a somewhat difficult argument to sustain. While gradually
changing, growth in production in China has largely occurred in
labour-intensive industries, which produce mass-market low-
value added output — textiles, clothing, footwear, toys, sporting
goods. Although China is replacing some production in US and
other industrialised countries, much of this had already moved
out to other locations in Asia, and it is from there, by and large,
19 Kamin, Marazzi and Schindler (2004).Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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that it is now migrating to China.
As a result of rising real wages in Asia, firms in these economies
have become less competitive in labour intensive manufacturing.
This has seen a transfer of production to China, displacing
exports from these economies. However, on the upside, China
imports large quantities from Asia, and in the process runs large
bilateral trade deficits with these countries, and consequently a
triangular trade pattern occurs. Those likely to lose out are labour
abundant regions, which have limited direct trade with China (i.e.
supply it with few raw materials or intermediate goods), while,
by in large, industrial countries should benefit from lower goods
prices and an expanding market in the long run.
(4) Is the Chinese peg supporting global imbalances?
During the period 2002-2003, the value of the US dollar declined
significantly against a number of currencies — by over 30 per
cent against the euro and Australian dollar, and by over 20 per
cent against sterling — as concerns grew about the ability of the
US to fund their massive current account deficit. Crucially
however, the dollar’s nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)
depreciated by just 11 per cent during this time, as foreign
exchange market intervention by some of the US’s major trading
partners restricted their currencies movements against the dollar.
By limiting the size of the NEER’s decline, these economies were
essentially minimising the potential reduction of the US’s external
deficit, and accordingly supporting the persistence of global
imbalances. Table 8 outlines how the dollar moved against a
number of currencies in 2002 and 2003, and, for each currency,
the corresponding economy’s bilateral goods balance with the
US. Despite imports from China playing a leading role in the
deterioration of the US external balance, the pegged exchange
rate has meant that the RMB remained unchanged against the
dollar throughout this period.
Table 8: The dollar against international currencies
(percentage change 2002-2003) and corresponding
trade balances in 2002-2003 (USD billions)
Currency % change Goods balance




Canadian dollar −18.8% −99.8
South Korean won −8.6% −26.2
Renminbi 0.0% −227.1
Mexican peso +22.9% −77.8
Note: (−) = dollar depreciation, (+) = dollar appreciation
Source: Ecowin
Aside from preventing a smooth global current account
adjustment, intervention activity has effectively meant thatQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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countries with flexible exchange rates have had to bear the
impact of the dollars decline. This has raised the issue of burden
sharing — the ‘fair’ contribution of the various trade partners of
the US to the correction of its current account deficit, reflecting
a concern that a sharp market driven adjustment for some
countries, but not for others, has had adverse implications for the
former, through negative shocks to competitiveness levels.
Initially it might appear the optimal (not to mention the equitable)
solution for the global economy would be for each country’s
adjustment share to be related to the size of the country’s goods
deficit with the US. However, the fact that exchange rates are
also determined by capital flows and trade in services
complicates the picture. Nevertheless it would seem the current
outcome — where the dollar fell by an average of just 5 per cent
against currencies of countries who made up more than half of
the goods deficit in the last two years
20 — is not an optimal
solution. Evidence suggests the most advantageous outcome lies
somewhere in between these two scenarios, and as a result
could only come about if currently managed currencies were to
become more flexible.
4.2.2 Long run issues
In the long run, as growth continues, China is likely to be affected
by global issues; including current account imbalances, the
transition to higher interest rates, emerging market debt and the
ongoing fiscal situation. However, China differs in a number of
ways to its comparators, which will work to its advantage — GDP
per capita is still at a low level, it has an untapped labour source
and domestic demand can support growth. In addition, China
benefits from a high savings rate, which will aid physical capital
formation in the medium term, and human capital, while
remaining lower than its comparators, is expected to continue
increasing (there is scope for soaking up untapped labour supply
as we see continued capital investment and FDI flows). On the
downside the fiscal outlook remains a source of vulnerability. As
trade integration proceeds, China’s impact will be most likely felt
through three key areas — trade effects, world prices and
financial channels.
 Trade effects — Studies attempting to quantify the impact
of China’s accession to the WTO generally agree that
economies will tend to benefit, or lose, in proportion to
how complimentary their trade patterns are with China’s.
The increase in the supply of labour intensive
manufactures from China will reduce their relative price
on world markets, benefiting countries that import a
substantial amount of these goods. Furthermore, as
20 China, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Canada accounted for over half the cumulative US
trade in goods deficit in 2002 and 2003, but the dollar depreciated by an average of just
5 per cent against their respective currencies.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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domestic demand increases, countries that export capital
and skill intensive goods, as well as food and energy, are
likely to gain from increased prices for their exports.
However, some developing countries may face a
‘‘hollowing out’’ of domestic manufacturing. Countries
that have an abundant supply of unskilled labour, and
who trade little with China but who compete with them
in export markets will possibly experience reduced
demand and lower prices for their own manufactures. In
addition, countries that are net importers of commodities
whose prices are driven up by Chinese demand may lose
out. Finally, there may be a significant impact on the
sectoral composition of output and on the income
distribution within, as well as across countries. For
example, China’s abundance of less-skilled labour could
lower the relative rewards for unskilled labour.
 World Prices — Rapid growth in China, and the shift in
production to China, may significantly affect prices of raw
materials and manufactured goods and services, while it
will put upward pressure on commodity prices, given the
relatively fixed supply of raw materials. The rapid
investment in infrastructure and certain industries has
contributed to increased prices of iron ore, copper and
oil, while shipping rates have also risen, given the
increased shipment of raw materials to China. However,
in the long run, as infrastructure improves, some of the
pressure on raw material prices should recede. In contrast,
the price of output should fall as we see an improvement
in efficiency, which should benefit consumers.
 Financial Channels — Over the past fifteen years, inward
FDI has benefited both China and foreign investors. It has
given investors the opportunity to diversify their holdings,
while also earning potentially higher returns. The extent
to which these benefits will remain, will depend on the
pace and precise form of China’s capital account
liberalisation. While, as a whole, the world economy is
likely to gain, some developing countries may suffer from
Chinese competition for scarce international capital. For
instance, higher FDI inflows to China may reduce FDI to
other developing countries. However, an alternative,
more positive view, is that increased FDI going to China
will complement flows to the rest of the region, and there
are possibilities that outward FDI from China to other
countries will expand even further.
Overall, the balance of these three effects is likely to be positive
for the global economy. However to ensure that they maximise
the benefits and minimise the costs of China’s integration, it is
imperative other countries increase their flexibility byQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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accelerating structural reforms. Furthermore, the maximum gains
can only be attained if the Chinese economy reaches its own full
potential. This itself will require a number of reforms, which are
discussed in detail in the following two sections.
5. Structural reforms
China has undertaken economic reforms that have liberalised
agricultural production, allowed the growth of a dynamic private
sector and gradually opened up the economy to international
trade and FDI. However, it still faces many significant structural
hurdles and its medium to long-term growth prospects will be
strongly influenced by the manner in which structural reforms
occur.
5.1 State involvement in production and banking
Prior to the economic reform process, economic activity was
dominated by state owned enterprises (SOEs) which geared
production to meet development goals and which automatically
received credit from the banking sector according to a national
development plan, regardless of their profitability or risk. While
much has changed since the reform process began, the banking
sector still exhibits the legacy of central planning, with the
government, at both central and local levels, continuing to play
an important role in credit allocation and the pricing of capital.
Commonly, priority is given to the state sector rather than private
enterprise with regard to both the availability and price of credit.
As a result there would appear to be a serious misallocation of
resources, with the bulk of bank credit channelled to the least
profitable and least efficient productive sector in the economy.
Their low profitability leaves SOEs financially vulnerable, which
has a second set of consequences — exposure to poor-
performing SOEs has had a major impact on bank performance.
Consequently Chinese banks have found themselves burdened
with a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) — with the most
exposed banks being the four state commercial banks (SCBs),
which account for around 85 per cent of the assets of the
banking sector. While the actual level of NPLs is subject to much
debate, there is general agreement that it is relatively high.
According to IMF estimates, non-performing loans in the Chinese
financial system amounted to 43 percent of GDP in mid 2003.
Of this, NPLs in the banking system accounted for 21 per cent
of total loans, the four SCBs held close to half of all NPLs, while
rural credit cooperatives reported 32 percent of their loans as
being NPLs.
There is little doubt that high NPLs are the result of state-directed
lending to unprofitable SOEs, which have been unable to repay
these loans. Bank vulnerability is accentuated by pressure on
NPLs to increase. While there have been some reforms aimed atQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
84
consolidating the SOE sector, SOEs cannot easily reduce their
costs (e.g. there are impediments to shedding workers), which
limits their competitiveness and profitability, as well as their
ability to service their debts. At the same time, because of their
continuing importance and the fact that they employ around 40
million workers, it is not seen as possible to cut off financing to
SOEs. As a result, banks have found themselves having to roll
over SOE loans, even when SOEs have defaulted on their debt,
which has reduced funding for more worthwhile investment
projects.
In short, what emerges is that the banking sector in China has
significant structural problems, which are intrinsically linked to
another structural problem, the level of state involvement in
production. Against the background of the current credit boom
this is a serious weakness. In effect, it raises the threat of an even
more pervasive misallocation of capital and the triggering of a
crisis in the banking sector. While there has been some attempt
to address the NPL problem through the creation of asset
management corporations (AMCs), to buy and manage bad
loans from the big four banks, the progress made by the AMCs
has been slow. Neither the legal nor the market infrastructure is
there to deal with this problem. Moreover, even after the transfer
of sizeable amounts of NPLs to AMCs, the banking sector still
has large bad loans on its books.
The banking sector in China faces major issues, namely, how to
resolve the NPL problem and how to transform Chinese banks
into viable, financially sound organisations. Transforming the
Chinese banking system will be far from straightforward. Given
the magnitude of the tasks involved, it could take a considerable
period before the banking system could be made sound. There
are a number of necessary requirements, which include the
capital adequacy of Chinese banks being radically improved
21,
banks being run on a commercial basis, complementary reforms
in other areas (in particular, reform of the operations of SOEs will
be required) and interest rate liberalisation, to end the
discrimination with regard to both the availability and cost of
credit between the public and private sectors.
5.2 Labour market
In the past twenty years a more market-orientated labour market
has emerged in China. The urban private sector has grown in
importance, while, even if more remains to be done, SOEs have
downsized. As the transition from a predominantly rural and
agrarian society to a more urban one continues, a number of
labour market issues are raised. It is estimated that more than
100 million rural workers have migrated, but despite the progress
21 This is likely to require significant state intervention, and as a result can only be brought
about at a sizeable fiscal cost.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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on reforms, a sizeable surplus of labour still exists. According to
IMF estimates, there is a surplus of about 150 million workers in
the rural sector and 10 million in SOEs — despite downsizing
(Brooks, 2004). This compares to an estimated total labour force
of around 740 million and total employment in the industrial and
services sector of around 370 million. Last year, the strength of
the export platform contributed positively to incomes and jobs,
and urban employment rose by a buoyant 8.6 million jobs.
However, unemployment rose on the back of structural job
losses in rural areas and layoffs from SOEs.
One underlying issue in the labour market is the need to build a
‘social safety net’. There is increasing pressure on social stability
stemming from the high level of unemployment, inadequate
pension and social security systems, and significant income
disparities. To date, social protection has been provided mainly
through the SOEs, which maintained jobs and provided a wide
range of social services for employees (including housing,
healthcare, education and pensions). As SOEs continue to
downsize, the government has been strengthening social support
systems in urban areas — expanding availability to all urban
residents and covering more rural residents.
Looking ahead, to ensure strong productivity growth, China
needs to create quality jobs for new entrants to the labour force
(via the private sector), as well as facilitate the surplus of labour.
For a more efficient and less segmented labour market, China
will need to allow greater mobility (i.e. restrictions on internal
migration reduced), improve worker skills, improve job search
services and strengthen the social safety net.
5.3 Fiscal issues
Chinese government debt is currently low by international
standards, especially in comparison to other emerging market
economies, increasing to 26 per cent of GDP in 2002. However
this data is slightly deceptive, and looking forward, concerns
persist about the sustainability of the Chinese fiscal position. As
table 9 shows, government debt has actually grown rapidly since
1997, and more than doubled in relation to GDP within the five-
year period 1997-2002. This increase reflected a sharp
deterioration in the budget position, as despite strong economic
expansion, revenue growth has been slow relative to
expenditures. The bulk of government debt — almost 85 per cent
in 2002 — is domestic based.
Table 9: Chinese government debt and budget balances, 1997-
2002 (in per cent of GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Govt Debt 11.4 17.8 20.9 22.8 24.0 25.6
Budget Deficit −1.8 −3.0 −4.0 −3.6 −3.2 −3.3
Source: IMFQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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The risks to the longer-term financial sustainability of the country
are connected, above all, with the costs of restructuring the
banking sector, restructuring other state-owned enterprises, and
the partially resulting strains on the social security systems. As
mentioned above, there will also be growing pressure in the
coming years for additional expenditure on establishing a social
safety net, and improving health and educational resources,
especially in lower income provinces. The authorities
acknowledge these problems, and have already pledged to
reform the tax system, improve fiscal management and allocate
more resources to areas such as education, health and social
security. They have also initiated a rolling three-year fiscal
framework to assure future policies are formulated in a medium
term context. However more will need to be done to make the
banking sector financially sound (see section 5.1) and reform the
current ‘pay-as-you-go’ pension system. The IMF recently noted
that the transition costs of moving to a fully funded system would
be significantly reduced if the shift were to be accompanied by
parameter changes, such as raising the retirement age and
indexing pensions to inflation rather than wages.
6. Exchange rate reform
The Chinese exchange rate system represents another area
where reform has become a necessity. In time, as China moves
to liberalise capital flows, it will also have to move to a more
flexible exchange rate regime. A relatively fixed exchange rate
target would be vulnerable in an environment of liberalised
capital flows and, in any event, even in present circumstances
China needs greater monetary policy independence to respond
to changing economic developments and conditions. Given the
restrictions on capital transactions that currently exist, however,
few observers have suggested the Chinese authorities should
allow their currency to float freely
22. Nevertheless, there is a
general belief that China should reform its exchange rate system
as soon as possible, with two of the more prominent proposals
coming from Goldstein and Lardy of the Institute for International
Economics and Eichengreen of the University of California.
Goldstein and Lardy (2003, 2) have suggested the Chinese
exchange rate regime should undergo a two-stage reform. The
first stage would involve revaluing the RMB by 15-25 per cent,
while simultaneously widening the band the authorities allow the
Chinese currency to float in (from plus or minus 0.3 per cent to
around 5 per cent), and replacing the unitary dollar peg with a
three-currency basket peg, incorporating the dollar, euro and yen
(with roughly equal weights). The second stage would see the
adoption of a managed float, to occur once the financial system
had been strengthened and the capital account significantly
22 And as was mentioned in section two, there is also broad agreement that the Chinese
authorities should not rush into liberalising their capital account.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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liberalised. A managed float would allow the currency to adjust
depending on market forces, but keep the option of official
intervention open to the PBC, to prevent overly volatile
movements. The authors believe this approach would remove
the burden of an undervalued RMB on the global economy in
the short-term, but would not rush the Chinese authorities into
liberalising their capital account too soon.
Eichengreen (2004), on the other hand, has proposed that the
Chinese authorities should ignore the first stage described above
and move straight to a managed float. While acknowledging that
the currency peg played a vital role when exports were the
primary growth producing sector in the economy, and
instruments of monetary management were under-developed,
Eichengreen believes that the Chinese authorities should now
adopt an inflation targeting strategy, based around a heavily
managed exchange rate. Under such a strategy the exchange
rate would remain a key policy instrument, and exchange rate
intervention would continue to occur in order to limit the impact
of currency fluctuations on inflation and the growth rate. The key
difference between this proposal and the current Chinese peg is
that there would no longer be a fixed centre rate or fixed bands
around which the exchange rate could fluctuate. Instead the
desired exchange rate, and permissible fluctuations around this
rate, would be constantly changing, depending on economic
developments and the impact that these developments were
having on the targets for growth and inflation.
By allowing the RMB to appreciate, adopting either of these
approaches would have a desired cooling effect on the domestic
economy. A re-valued RMB should make domestic exports
somewhat less competitive on global markets
23, and would also
place downward pressure on the domestic money supply — and
temper investment expenditure — by reducing short-term capital
inflows and the accumulation of foreign reserves
24. Adopting one
of the two approaches should also have a positive impact on
global imbalances, placing downward pressure on China’s trade
surplus with the US, and weakening some of the burden on
economies with more flexible economies
25. These global effects
could be reinforced if other Asian economies, taking China’s
lead, were to also allow their exchange rates appreciate against
the dollar.
23 However, the impact could be limited by strong growth in China’s main export markets. If
this were the case, the positive income effect in these countries could outweigh the
negative price effect.
24 Reflecting weaker speculative activity and less foreign exchange intervention respectively.
25 It is important to note however, that, irrespective of the exchange rate system adopted by
the Chinese authorities, reform will only have a limited impact on global imbalances. This
reflects the fact that exchange rate adjustment will probably have to be combined with
growth differentials — weaker US growth compared to the rest of the world, or stronger
growth in the rest of the world compared to the US — to bring the US current account
deficit to more sustainable levels.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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The divergence between the two approaches reflects more
general differences about when an economy should allow their
currency to float. While Goldstein and Lardy suggest that this
should not happen until the economy’s capital account has been
fully liberalised, Eichengreen believes that a closed capital
account only rules out adopting a free floating currency, and not
a more flexible one
26. Moving straight to a floating regime would
remove the limitation of the two-stage reform — not giving the
Chinese authorities any greater autonomy over monetary policy
for as long as they remain in stage one. However, Eichengreen’s
proposal is also not without its problems. The major concern in
any reform of the RMB’s exchange rate must be the impact that
it would have on the underdeveloped Chinese financial system.
While the paper assures that tight capital controls would insulate
the banking system from a more flexible exchange rate, a risk
would remain that the latter could not be fully relied upon as the
capital account appears to be growing increasingly porous. The
key question is whether the returns from the Chinese authorities
having an autonomous monetary policy would be of a
magnitude to make this a risk worth taking. On the one hand,
these gains are likely to be sizeable, but on the other, there
would be a significant global fallout should the Chinese financial
system collapse. Accordingly the answer to this question, and the
decision over which regime the authorities should adopt, is far
from straightforward.
7. Conclusion
China’s role in the global economy has increased considerably
in the last 25 years. Over this period it has grown rapidly to
become the third largest trading nation in the world, and the
sixth largest global economy. This improving position has been
driven by a number of factors, including structural reforms, FDI
inflows and a favourable exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the
trend of rapid integration and strong economic growth has
continued into the more immediate term, despite the difficult
world economic environment. Real GDP grew by 9.1 per cent
in 2003, picking up to 9.8 per cent in the first quarter of this
year, on the back of solid growth in consumption, investment
and exports.
This has led to concerns that the Chinese economy may be
overheating, an issue of greater importance today than in the
past. Given the Chinese economy is now serving as an engine
of growth for the international community, any temporary but
dramatic economic setback would have a far greater impact on
the global economy than it would have done ten years ago. This
is one of a number of issues that China’s integration has brought
26 Eichengreen notes that the principle rationales for delaying the move to a managed float
— negative consequences for the banking system, excessive exchange rate volatility and
the inability of firms to insure against exchange rate movements — do not apply in China’s
circumstances.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2004
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to the fore. Developments in China are likely to have positive
effects on some economies and negative ones on others —
reflecting terms of trade effects, its impact on world prices and
through financial channels. Countries will tend to benefit, or lose,
in proportion to the degree of complementarity between their
trade patterns and China’s. The impact is likely to be felt within
as well as across countries, but overall, the gains are likely to
outstrip the losses, and China’s emergence is expected to be a
broadly positive development internationally.
To ensure the global economy maximises the benefits and
minimises the costs of China’s integration, vital reforms are
required domestically and internationally. The outlook for the
Chinese economy depends critically on the pace of structural
reforms, most notably to the industrial and banking sectors, and
to the current exchange rate system. In other economies, greater
flexibility is necessary to limit the inevitable adjustment costs that
are likely to emerge as China continues to develop.
In conclusion, China’s emergence has brought to the fore many
challenges, which are likely to necessitate adjustments in some
economies. These adjustments are likely to include changes to a
number of real and nominal macroeconomic variables, including
exchange rates, prices, wages, domestic production levels,
returns to capital and trade balances. However, overall the
impact for the global economy should be positive, facilitating
cheaper labour intensive imports, a greater demand for skill
intensive goods and services, and crucially, higher global output.
China’s emergence will act as a large and positive boost to global
productive capacity, the equivalent to a large positive supply
shock. In the long run, it is important for the world economy
that comparative advantages of countries such as China are not
hindered.
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